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Abstract
Background: Health research increasingly relies on organized collections of health data and biological samples.
There are many types of sample and data collections that are used for health research, though these are collected
for many purposes, not all of which are health-related. These collections exist under different jurisdictional and
regulatory arrangements and include:
1) Population biobanks, cohort studies, and genome databases
2) Clinical and public health data
3) Direct-to-consumer genetic testing
4) Social media
5) Fitness trackers, health apps, and biometric data sensors
Ethical, legal, and social challenges of such collections are well recognized, but there has been limited attention to
the broader societal implications of the existence of these collections.
Discussion: Although health research conducted using these collections is broadly recognized as beneficent,
secondary uses of these data and samples may be controversial. We examine both documented and
hypothetical scenarios of secondary uses of health data and samples. In particular, we focus on the use of
health data for purposes of:
 Forensic investigations
 Civil lawsuits
 Identification of victims of mass casualty events
 Denial of entry for border security and immigration
 Making health resource rationing decisions
 Facilitating human rights abuses in autocratic regimes
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Conclusions: Current safeguards relating to the use of health data and samples include research ethics
oversight and privacy laws. These safeguards have a strong focus on informed consent and anonymization,
which are aimed at the protection of the individual research subject. They are not intended to address
broader societal implications of health data and sample collections. As such, existing arrangements are
insufficient to protect against subversion of health databases for non-sanctioned secondary uses, or to provide
guidance for reasonable but controversial secondary uses. We are concerned that existing debate in the
scholarly literature and beyond has not sufficiently recognized the secondary data uses we outline in this
paper. Our main purpose, therefore, is to raise awareness of the potential for unforeseen and unintended
consequences, in particular negative consequences, of the increased availability and development of health
data collections for research, by providing a comprehensive review of documented and hypothetical non-
health research uses of such data.
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legal, social implications; EMR, Electronic medical record; IRB, Institutional review board; NBS, Newborn
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Background
Organised collections of biological samples and personal
information have become increasingly important for
health research, particularly in achieving translational
aims to improve primary prevention, diagnosis, and
treatment [1]. Increasing reliance on biobanks and
health databases has led to significant escalations in
funding to support the collection of tissue and informa-
tion as is evident, for example, in the recently an-
nounced U.S. Precision Medicine Initiative [2, 3]. That
the use of health data for research is associated with sig-
nificant ethical challenges is well recognised. A vibrant
community of ELSI (ethical, legal, social implications)
scholars has been debating issues such as informed con-
sent requirements for biobanks, privacy implications of
long-term storage of health data and data sharing, and
the return of findings to research participants [4–11].
Most of these debates occur in the context of research
ethics frameworks aimed at the protection of individual
research participants. However, information collected in
health research, particularly genomic data, also has im-
plications for social groups (family and identifiable eth-
nic groups) to which individuals belong, and for society
as a whole.
Although there are many effective mechanisms in
place to protect personal data collections, there has been
relatively little consideration of the potential conse-
quences of the proliferation of organised collections of
detailed and highly personal information on a broader
societal level. In particular, there is a paucity of attention
to non-research uses for which such data collections
might be employed, irrespective of the original inten-
tions of the builders and the expressed purposes of the
platforms. New data and new forms of research, and
most importantly, new research platforms and institu-
tions, create new possibilities; they therefore establish
new societal affordances beyond their utility for health
research.
The purpose of this paper is to present a comprehen-
sive review of potential uses of health data collections
that are largely unforeseen and unintended by the bio-
medical research community. In so doing, we acknow-
ledge the socially valuable health research that has been
conducted through secondary use of data. We also ac-
knowledge the important role the ELSI community has
played in facilitating ethical use of such data. Neverthe-
less, we believe that key issues have not received suffi-
cient attention, which becomes apparent when one
considers some of the implications of living in a society
in which the collection and electronic storage of health
data have become increasingly normalized.
We begin by outlining the types of health data collec-
tions we are concerned with. These include collections
established specifically for health research, as well as
some collected for other reasons, but which have subse-
quently become valuable for health related research. In
particular, we focus on human tissue biobanks, public
health data collections, and data accumulated by private
entities, such as direct-to-consumer genetic testing com-
panies, Facebook, and fitness trackers. We then consider
potential secondary uses of these data collections that
are outside of, or even contrary to, the scope and pur-
pose of the types of collections we have outlined. In our
analysis, we consider secondary uses of health data for
which instances have already been documented inter-
nationally (such as forensic investigations, civil law suits,
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and mass casualty events). We then consider a hypothet-
ical scenario, the potential for health databases to be
used for health care rationing decisions, to illustrate how
shifting social priorities and interests might lead to re-
purposing of health data collections. Finally, we consider
some historical examples of how population data collec-
tions subsequently came to facilitate large scale human
rights abuses.
Taken together, these examples illustrate that ethical
analysis of the development and use of health data collec-
tions is inadequate if it is limited to narrow consideration
of risks and benefits, especially when this is focused on in-
dividual research participants. Rather, the development of
health data collections and the potential uses they enable
constitute critical shifts in the societal environment that
should be subject to democratic scrutiny and decision-
making procedures. Research ethics oversight (in the form
of Institutional Review Boards and similar bodies) is not
capable of guarding against the type of uses we discuss.
Our intention is to raise awareness of these issues in the
hope that they will be discussed more prominently in ELSI
and related communities and, ultimately, lead to robust
protections.
Discussion
Organised collections of personal health data
Data that are useful for health research come from a
range of sources and can be made available to re-
searchers through a variety of mechanisms. We are con-
cerned here primarily with data that are stored for long
or indefinite periods of time as part of an organised col-
lection. In particular, we focus on population biobanks,
cohort studies, and genome databases; clinical and pub-
lic health records; genetic data collected through direct-
to-consumer genetic testing; data collected through so-
cial media; and data collected by fitness trackers, health
apps, and biometric data sensors. In this context, we are
cognisant of important differences in legal definitions
and other uses between biological data, information, da-
tabases, and biological samples [12–14]. For the pur-
poses of this paper, we are concerned with the societal
consequences of collections including all of these
categories.
Population biobanks, cohort studies, and genome
databases
Researchers increasingly access data from central reposi-
tories and are expected to contribute data they generate
to such repositories [15–17] (see also the United States
NIH policy on data sharing) [18]. Driven largely by the
rationale of maximizing the utility of data generated by
public funding for health research [19], many journals
now require that researchers make their data publicly
available as a condition of publication (e.g., PLOS,
Nature) [20, 21]. Similarly, population biobanks collect
and store biological samples and associated personal
health and demographic information for the purpose of
facilitating health research. Many population biobanks
are also associated with ongoing follow-up of partici-
pants and so are best characterized as cohort studies
(e.g., The Canadian Longitudinal Study on Aging) [22].
In contrast to data gathered for the purpose of a particu-
lar study, data gathered for population biobanks are
intended, from the outset, to be of benefit to as many re-
search studies as possible. Such biobanks thus rely on
significant public investment to create a research infra-
structure that is widely accessible for an indefinite
period of time.
The types of data that are collected and shared vary
across studies and biobanks, but may include: demo-
graphic information, disease history, health related be-
haviours, psychosocial information, a wide variety of
biological measures, brain scans, and genetic informa-
tion [23, 24]. Depending on the type of collection,
directly identifying information may be linked to individ-
ual level records [25]. With scientific and technological
advances, new forms of data collection are being en-
abled. For example, there is now a large number of
whole genome and exome sequences that have been
generated as part of different research endeavours, and
efforts are under way for creating data storage mecha-
nisms that would increase accessibility of these se-
quences to scientists [26]. There is also an increasing
use of natural language processing in mining of clinical
data [27, 28], which makes strategies of anonymization
difficult to implement.
In the past, research ethics protocols often assumed a
direct relationship between research participants and the
researcher(s) who recruited them for a particular study,
and this expectation is still evident among many re-
search participants [29]. When data are shared beyond
the original researchers or when data are collected for
large research platforms, which will be used by multiple
researchers, stewardship of data often cannot be located
meaningfully with a particular researcher. Personal data
collections are therefore associated with institutions (i.e.,
the biobank, or the health data repository), rather than
individuals. While publics and research participants, in
particular, tend to be supportive of having their samples
used in future research, this view depends on a number
of factors including: the country where the research is
conducted, characteristics of the research participants,
the type of sample, and who will have access to the sam-
ples [30, 31]. The importance of appropriate governance
for biobanks and data collections has been widely ac-
knowledged [32–34], though in practice, governance of
these resources tends to be located within the scientific
community. For example, governance of the NIH
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Database of Genotypes and Phenotypes (dbGaP) and
other U.S. NIH repositories is controlled by data access
committees appointed by NIH, which are limited to fed-
eral employees and generally consist of scientists working
within NIH [35]. dbGaP specifically prohibits institutions
submitting data from adding their own safeguards over
and above enforcement of consent (e.g., in the process of
submitting data to dbGaP research institutions would not
be allowed to add institutional requirements to safeguard
samples/data, beyond enforcement of consent).
Clinical and public health data
Every interaction between an individual and a health
care provider leads to information being recorded about
symptoms, health histories, and past or current medica-
tions. This information is, in the first instance, directly
linked with the patient’s name and other personal identi-
fiers (e.g., address, health insurance number, etc.). Much
of this information is also shared with pharmacies (to fill
a prescription), health insurance companies (for reim-
bursement), labs (where testing may be completed) and
other test locations. The primary purpose of collecting
this information is to provide optimal health care for in-
dividuals and communities.
What then happens with this information varies by
jurisdiction. In Canada, for example, such data are sent
to the provincial health insurer, in part to allow physi-
cians and other health care specialists to be paid. If an
individual is hospitalized, further data are collected and
analyzed to maintain records of: wait times for care, type
of care provided, and ultimate resolution (for example,
discharge to long-term care). This information is also
collated centrally by the Canadian Institute for Health
Information (CIHI) for research on quality of care. In
the US, although health care systems vary by state and
health data are not automatically pooled, Medicare data
are aggregated and studied, much like the Canadian
data. Also, specific data collation efforts collect various
types of health data from health care organizations (e.g.,
the U.S. CDC’s collection of ambulatory health data)
[36], and information is also collated by insurance com-
panies to determine eligibility and pay the providers.
Regardless of the type of health care system, individual
health information may be shared to some degree with
other health care providers for the purposes of clinical
care [37]. In addition, some of these data may be shared
outside of the health care system for the purposes of re-
search. Across jurisdictions there is also a trend to move
increasingly towards electronic medical records (EMR),
which facilitate data sharing for improving clinical care
and research [38]. In some instances, there has been sig-
nificant controversy surrounding the use of health data
collected for clinical purposes, for subsequent research
purposes. For example, in Denmark, over a period of
several years the Danish General Practice Database reused
confidential information about patients’ diagnoses for
purposes of analysis and research without patients’ or
physicians’ consent and awareness [39].
In addition to health information collected at point of
care, information and biological samples are also col-
lected in public health and screening programs. For ex-
ample, many countries have newborn screening (NBS)
programs. The primary purpose of these programs is to
test for rare diseases such as phenylketonuria that are
critical to detect in the early days of life [40]. A blood
sample is collected from infants to conduct these diag-
nostic tests, but once the sample is collected, there is
ethical ambiguity about what can or should be done with
it [41], [42]. Often these collections are not “consented”
and how they are governed and whether samples may be
used for other purposes varies dramatically across juris-
dictions [43, 44]. There has been significant public con-
troversy about secondary research uses of newborn
bloodspots [45] and while research shows that in the US
the public tends to be supportive of the program, there
is a preference for parental opt-in for secondary research
uses [46].
For different types of health data and across jurisdic-
tions, there is variation as to whether individuals are in-
formed about the fact that their personal information is
collected and used for research. If individuals are in-
formed, there is variation in whether consent processes
are in place, and whether these are opt-in or opt-out
based (in many cases legislation is in place that allows
for research use of samples and data without consent for
quality assurance purposes). This strong focus on col-
lecting, storing, and sharing personal and aggregate
health data is frequently rationalized as supporting the
development of a more “personalized medicine” [47] or
“precision medicine” [48].
Direct-to-consumer genetic testing
Since their development, genetic tests have been offered
to individuals through referral within the health care sys-
tem in most jurisdictions in which they are available. In
recent years there has been a proliferation of commercial
companies that offer genetic tests for purchase “direct-
to-consumer” (DTC) [49]. These genetic tests claim to
provide such information as how individuals will re-
spond to certain drugs, verification of paternity, tracing
of ancestry, and identifying propensities for psycho-
logical or physical health conditions [50–53]. In procur-
ing such services, an individual submits a DNA sample,
often with additional personal information.
In the process of providing such services, DTC genetic
testing companies accumulate large amounts of personal
information on individuals. However, it is not clear how
such data are managed. In 2012, 86 companies offered
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genetic testing services online [54]. Of these, only 28 dis-
closed what would be done with samples and information
after the commercial transaction was concluded. It has be-
come clear that for at least some of these companies, the
financial gain from the transaction with individuals pro-
curing the genetic test is not intended to be the primary
source of revenue. Rather, the business model relies on
the sale of the data to third parties [55, 56]. Interestingly,
private firms operating EMRs (see previous section) also
adopt business models that assume that a substantial por-
tion of their revenue comes from analysis of data in the
records they keep for employers and insurers for private
insurance plans [57].
Social media
In contrast to the types of health data collections consid-
ered above, social media illustrate an accumulation of
personal information that is more complex and sensitive
to individual disclosure decisions. The information in-
herent in data from social media is also more dynamic
and potentially far richer than other data sources in that
it includes historical and up-to-date information about
relationships, associations, and behaviours.
Social media are receiving increasing attention from
social scientists, but are rarely considered in the context
of health information. Many individuals willingly reveal
very large amounts of personal information on social
media sites, which enables the construction of an exten-
sive picture of their health, lifestyle, biography, and be-
havior. For example, on sites such as Facebook, it is
quite common for individuals to share personally identi-
fying information such as birthdays, email addresses, ad-
dresses, and current or previous schools [58]. People
also commonly share behavioral and biographical infor-
mation such as daily activities, interests, habits, hobbies,
marital or relationship status, family and friend connec-
tions, all documented through comments, photos, and
videos. Although people do not typically share their so-
cial security number (SSN), it has been shown that SSNs
and other personal data can be inferred by aggregating
information that people share online and publicly avail-
able information about them [59]. Other less commonly
shared information such as sexual orientation can also
be predicted from network connections [60]. Recent use
of Facebook as a platform for research has resulted in
widespread outrage, based primarily on the involvement
of Facebook users in a study without their informed
consent [61].
Fitness trackers, health apps, and biometric data sensors
The widespread use of mobile and wearable devices such
as smartphones, fitness trackers and their associated
health applications (apps) allows the measurement of a
vast range of activities and physiological characteristics
for health and performance. From daily habits and activ-
ities that users enter, to data recorded by cell phones
and other devices through GPS and accelerometer read-
ings (e.g. step counts or distance travelled), mobile de-
vices and apps can monitor people with little effort or
awareness on their part. Private companies and health
researchers alike are eager to exploit the rich, real-time
data streams these generate. Apple, for example, recently
released its ResearchKit [62] to facilitate the develop-
ment of health research applications for their devices.
The day ResearchKit was launched, apps were also re-
leased to aid researchers in studying heart disease, Par-
kinson’s disease, breast cancer, diabetes and asthma [63].
Irrespective of concerns about their effectiveness [64],
what is certain is that such apps and devices enable the
generation of highly organised collections of very per-
sonal information. Few apps or devices are subject to
government regulation despite the fact that they collect
health information or offer health advice [65]. Even apps
that have been accredited (e.g., by the NHS in the UK)
have been shown to fall short of data protection standards
[66]. Perhaps even more disconcerting is the automatic
and unobtrusive collection of biometric measurements
enabled by wearable sensors. For example, in some com-
puter games physiological measures are used to assess the
arousal level of gamers with the goal of optimising game
play difficulty on an individual basis [67]. Gamification
has also been suggested as a way of increasing adherence
to health app use [68]. However, increased use of wearable
technology and other connected devices is not without
risks and these devices have become available before the
societal implications of the data they provide have been
fully considered [69].
In summary, multiple mechanisms can be identified
whereby personal health related data are collected and
made available to researchers in an organized fashion.
Arguably, none of these data are collected for nefarious
purposes. Indeed, if even a small proportion of the
promised benefits of “big data” are realized, there is
likely to be much benefit in them. These collections also
exist under different governance regimes: ethics of clin-
ical care, public health ethics, law, research ethics proto-
cols, and commercial contracts between individuals and
service providers. The collections rely on different types
of funding: public/governmental research funding, health
care system funding, consumer funding, advertising rev-
enue models, and mixed funding models. The various
collections also have different intended time horizons.
Unintended and unforeseen uses of health data
collections
The possibilities inherent in analysis of “big data” have
been heralded as beneficial for health and as potentially
decreasing health care costs [70]. However, it is self-
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evident that data collected for one purpose might also
be used for other purposes not intended or envisaged at
the time of collection. Indeed, some of the examples out-
lined above, such as newborn blood spot collections and
biorepositories in pathology laboratories, have already
been repurposed for secondary uses (i.e., samples and
data originally collected for clinical or public health pur-
poses were subsequently used for research). It is, indeed,
conceivable that data collected for research purposes will
eventually be used for yet other purposes [71].
Graves [72] argues that electronic health records rep-
resent the kind of organized collection of data that is at-
tractive to domestic governments for surveillance and
protection of its own population, to hostile foreign gov-
ernments for espionage and sabotage, to commercial en-
tities for generating revenue, and to criminals for illegal
forms of profit. Given this environment of potentially
hostile interests in health data, Graves suggests a com-
pelling metaphor:
“Given our security design and likely attackers, our
situation is something like this. It is as if we had
each taken the valuable contents of our homes and
deposited them, carefully indexed, in a huge
warehouse somewhere in the country. We then give
the warehouse owner and his employees careful
instructions about who may access and use these
valuables. Thoughtfully, the warehouse owner
creates a special passage into the warehouse—a
“portal”—by which we may access a few of our
own possessions if we wish. The builder of the
warehouse has equipped it with a very fancy lock
(AES with 128- to 256-bit keys) that the owner
may choose to use if he thinks he’s in a bad neigh-
borhood. Meanwhile, there are four different large,
well-trained, well-equipped, and materiel-hungry
armies in easy marching distance. Will the ware-
house owner and his employees lay down their
lives, or will they open the lock? Or will they dis-
cover their warehouse is riddled with secret back
doors, or that the armies have really big bolt cut-
ters (secret supercomputers that can do a brute
force attack on AES), or that the lock has an
equally fancy secret master key?” (p. 113)
Perhaps Graves’s metaphor is too dramatic. Moreover,
some of the secondary, non-research, uses that might
arise for health data collections may be deemed uncon-
troversial or even broadly beneficial. But it would be
naïve to think that organized collections of health data
are of no interest to those outside of the health care and
research community. With this in mind, we now illus-
trate some brief examples of conceivable secondary uses
of health data and biological samples.
Forensic investigations
Health data and organised collections of DNA, in par-
ticular, have important forensic uses [73]. Samples and
information collected for health purposes may include
information about individuals that is not routinely
available in data collections available to law enforcement
(or other) agencies. Situations can therefore arise in
which the investigative opportunities afforded by existing
health databases are of great interest for forensic and re-
lated purposes. Many examples illustrate this point. In
some cases, the urgency of the situations that prompted
requests for database access has meant that decisions
were made without sufficient opportunity to engage in a
fuller consultative process or consideration of the range
of potential privacy and ethical issues.
A high profile case in the United States implicated the
Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS) in
providing 8350 de-identified NBS samples to researchers
without parental knowledge or consent [74]. In the
midst of a class action lawsuit brought against the DSHS
in 2009, it was revealed that the DSHS also gave 800
samples to the Armed Forces DNA Identification La-
boratory (AFDIL) to help create a national mitochon-
drial DNA database for use in forensic investigation of
missing persons and cold cases [1, 75]. It is worth noting
here that this was not just a one-off use of the NBS data,
which might have been justified on particular grounds,
but rather the development (and repurposing) of a DNA
database for forensic purposes.
When the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Anna
Lindh, was assassinated in 2003, police requested access
to the suspected attacker’s DNA from a national NBS
biobank to compare against DNA from the crime scene.
Police were granted access, resulting in the conviction of
the assassin [76]. It is important to note that in this case
there was no court involvement. The biobank acceded to
the police request directly [77]. In an armed robbery in
Norway, a cancer patient was a prime suspect. The sus-
pect had died six months after the robbery, but tissue
samples had been collected in a hospital biobank. Police
wanted to compare DNA found at the robbery site with
the suspect’s DNA from the biobank sample. In this
instance police access was denied by the Norwegian
Supreme Court [78].
Civil lawsuits
There are multiple cases involving claims of paternity,
typically related to disputes over inheritance, that lead to
requests or attempts to access DNA samples stored in
biobanks. In another Norwegian case, a dispute relating
to claims of biological kinship led to access being
granted to tissue samples from a hospital biobank. In
this case, the Norwegian Supreme Court argued that the
claimant’s right to know his parents superceded laws
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prohibiting biobanks from giving access to samples with-
out the sample donor’s consent, who in this case was
dead [79].
Mass casualty events
In a Swedish case, a temporary amendment to the law
restricting access to biobanks was passed after the 2004
Asian tsunami to allow for the use of samples from na-
tional NBS registries for identification of victims [80].
The decision was based on arguments emphasizing the
great benefit to family members of the victims, while as-
suming that there is no reason to believe that people
whose samples are being used would object to this use
(though it should be noted that this decision was not
without its critics).
DNA analysis was also used for victim identification
purposes following both the 9/11 World Trade Centre
attack and Hurricane Katrina, although this was
achieved through kinship analysis with DNA samples
obtained voluntarily from family members [81]. How-
ever, following such cases, some bioethicists have argued
in favor of third-party access to health databases and
biobanks after mass casualty events [82].
Border security and immigration
Contemporary examples of third-party access to health
data or biobanks in the context of immigration and
border security are comparatively rare. However, it can
be argued that health databases afford similar opportun-
ities to agencies wishing to exploit their potential. Fol-
lowing 9/11 many states have passed anti-terror
legislation to intensify surveillance of “suspect popula-
tions” and control their movement [83]. Many of these
laws, such as the USA Patriot Act, grant security agen-
cies broad powers to access private records without noti-
fying the subjects of those records that an invasion of
their privacy is being contemplated. The Patriot Act in
particular has implications for non-U.S. jurisdictions,
like the government of British Columbia, that have
contracted with U.S. corporations to manage their elec-
tronic health records. Such corporations would be com-
pelled to grant access to health records as a result of an
application by a security agency using a much less strin-
gent standard of proof [84].
One case in which health data may have been accessed
by border personnel involved a Canadian woman attempt-
ing to travel to the United States in 2013 and being denied
entry on the basis of a medical history of depression and
attempted suicide. The woman, author Ellen Richardson,
has written openly about her struggles with depression
and suicide, and reported to the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation (CBC) that border officials cited her
hospitalization for depression in June 2012 as the reason
for the denial of entry [85]. Further investigation by
Canadian journalists did not clarify how U.S. border offi-
cials gained access to Richardson’s medical history, but re-
vealed that contact with the police through 911 calls is
routinely recorded in the database of the Canadian Police
Information Centre. Sometimes these encounter reports
include information about mental health. This database is
shared with the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and
other U.S. security agencies [86]. Richardson, however, re-
ported that her 2012 hospitalization only involved contact
with medical personnel in an ambulance, and not the po-
lice. The possibility that U.S. border officials are accessing
Canadian health information is being investigated by the
Ontario Privacy Commissioner [85].
What these examples illustrate is that the mere exist-
ence of collections of health data and biological samples
creates possibilities for action and use that would other-
wise not have been available. In cases like the tsunami,
redirecting use of these resources found strong social
support in spite of some controversy. In contrast, the
use of NBS samples in Texas for forensic purposes led
to wide-spread public outcry. While recognising that
there are legal barriers to law enforcement and/or gov-
ernmental access to data and samples, these cases dem-
onstrate the potential that exists for DNA originally
obtained for the purposes of public health screening or
health research to be repurposed for law enforcement.
As Kaye [87] has argued, large, centrally managed health
databases cannot but be of interest to law enforcement
and forensic communities, who are themselves advocat-
ing for the creation of large databases or biobanks to aid
investigations [88, 89]. These developments have led
legal scholars in the U.S. to warn that assumptions about
privacy and unreasonable search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment do not account for the expanded in-
vestigative and surveillance capabilities afforded by bio-
banks and big data analytics [89–92].
In each of these cases, data/biospecimens were col-
lected for specific purposes related to health care or
health research. The consents provided – or in the case
of NBS, the implied consent – did not extend to legal or
security uses. Arguably, the bioethical principles and
privacy protections governing the original consent were
negated when access was allowed after the fact for other
purposes. While democratically sanctioned processes or
ethical reasoning may have been applied in some cases,
as in the use of NBS samples for identification after the
2004 Asian tsunami, in others legal or other consider-
ations were allowed to overrule the protections and un-
derstandings in place when the data/biospecimens were
provided. These examples illustrate the limitations of the
confidentiality protections that researchers are realistic-
ally able to offer research participants in many legal en-
vironments [93]. Even where legal protections exist
(such as Certificates of Confidentiality in the U.S.), their
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practical efficacy in preventing access has yet to be
tested in court, especially when “national security”
or other perceived pressing national interests are im-
plicated [94].
Health resource allocations
A major challenge in presenting an analysis of unintended
and unforeseen consequences is that we cannot know
the ways in which particular societal interests develop
and new ones emerge. But it is precisely these un-
foreseen uses we would like to highlight. The follow-
ing example about health resource allocation is
intended to illustrate a possible trajectory of societal
interests in which health research data collections
might come to find very different uses.
All health care systems currently use some method for
rationing the provision of resources [95] and current
forms of health care delivery are unlikely to be sustain-
able in many jurisdictions [96]. In addition to demands
associated with a demographic shift in age profile and an
ever expanding range of new treatment options, costs of
treatment are growing, in some cases dramatically.
Drugs to treat rare diseases, which in aggregate may in-
clude as many as 1 in 12 Canadians [97] can exceed
$300,000 per patient per year, in contrast to an average
cost of under $1000 per person per year across the Can-
adian population [98]. Similarly, cancer drugs may cost
tens of thousands of dollars for short term life extension
[99]. These pressures on health care systems mean that
governments and health insurers have to make increas-
ingly difficult decisions about how to ration limited
health resources.
Understandably, attempts toward rationing are contro-
versial, especially when these are seen to be discrimin-
atory. This is evident, for example, in recent media
coverage in the UK about non-research uses of identifi-
able personal health information for risk stratification
purposes (see, for example, [100]). Similar programs in
the U.S. seek to identify frequent uses of ER admissions
for the specific reason of targeting them for additional
services [101–104].
Given pressures on health care systems, more drastic
measures might be taken in the future to inform and en-
act rationing decisions. These trends might therefore
lead to attempts to access health data collections for
purposes of facilitating health resource rationing deci-
sions. Governments and health insurers already have ac-
cess to large amounts of personal health information
about individual citizens, and in some cases legal protec-
tions are in place to guard against discriminatory prac-
tices. But legal protections are limited, and the types of
health data collections available for research (outlined
above) arguably extend the information otherwise avail-
able to health providers.
Lifestyle factors and personal health information are
already used to make decisions by insurers about pre-
miums and, in some instances, to exclude certain people
from receiving coverage, as is done with life insurance
coverage [105]. In the U.S., the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), in place since 2009,
makes it illegal for health insurance companies or em-
ployers (through which people usually access health in-
surance) to discriminate based on genetic data [106] and
the Affordable Care Act enacted in 2010 protects con-
sumers against health insurance discrimination based on
pre-existing conditions and against rate hikes based on
medical diagnoses [107]. However, neither Act addresses
life insurance [105]. In Europe, regulations prohibiting
insurance discrimination based on genetic data have
been in place for more than two decades, starting in
1990 in Belgium. However, these laws may in some cases
be too narrow to fully protect people from the use of
data associated with genetic information [108]. Some
have also argued that there are benefits to using genetic
test results in assessing insurance premiums because
doing so allows insurers to be more specific about who
is at risk, rather than penalizing everyone in a particular
category (e.g., women who have a family history of
breast cancer but themselves do not have the particular
mutation that would place them at increased risk) [109].
Information about individuals’ health behaviours is ar-
guably of interest in making health resource decisions
because behavioural data (smoking, drinking, diet, exer-
cise) are strong predictors of health outcomes [110]. In-
deed, incentive-based health programs already rely on
such data to shape individuals’ health behaviours, a prac-
tice which has been heavily criticized on ethical grounds
and has potential for discrimination [111–113]. This po-
tential for discrimination has been well documented
among smokers. In contrast to other areas of health and
social policy which have worked to counteract stigma-
tisation of affected groups and individuals, policy on to-
bacco control in some jurisdictions has actively sought
to create stigma against smokers. These strategic stigma-
tisation efforts are associated with some alarming conse-
quences, including surgeons refusing to treat smokers or
pushing them down waiting lists, and family doctors not
taking on smokers in their clinics or providing them
with lower quality care [114]. Insurance discrimination
has also been documented based on risky behaviours like
extreme sports (sky diving, etc.) [115].
Risk stratification can be used to ensure effective allo-
cation of limited health care resources across a popula-
tion. Further, individuals whose behavior puts them at
increased health risk might legitimately be required to
accept the financial burdens of those risks. However, cri-
teria for determining ‘effective allocation’ and classifying
what kinds of behaviour qualify as ‘high risk’ inevitably
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require value based judgments. Therefore, all decisions
relating to health care coverage are inevitably political
[116] with strong moral dimensions [117]. We are here
not advocating for or against particular approaches to
health care allocation (e.g., luck egalitarianism). Rather,
our point is that the use of health data to help inform
health resource allocation is not simply a technical step
in refining such decisions; the way they are used de-
pends on particular values which should be subject to
democratic scrutiny. Moreover, it is typically only so-
cially privileged individuals who are able to dedicate
their lives to health pursuits in ways that conform to
merit based norms. With increasing pressure on finan-
cial sustainability of health care systems, it is not diffi-
cult to envisage increasing pressure to adopt merit based
allocation of health resources, with those who are more
“responsible” with their health and conform to rational-
istic norms of health decision-making and personal life
style choices rewarded with greater access to health re-
sources, while non-conformers (e.g., smokers; vaccin-
ation refusers; screening non-attenders; non-compliant
patients; sedentary habits) are punished with diminished
access [118]. Social media data are a prime candidate to
support such assessments. Indeed, some insurers cur-
rently offer incentives to people who provide their health
information (particularly behavioural data) in exchange
for a discount on premiums, as long as they show
healthy behaviour [119–121]. This places individuals
who conscientiously object to this practice at a disadvan-
tage to the extent that the discounts offered to those
who comply are likely offset by increased premiums for
those who refuse.
Human rights abuses and eugenics
Some of the health data collections (fitness trackers, so-
cial media, DTC genetic testing) we consider here have
been developed relatively recently. However, population
data have been collected historically and the examin-
ation of how certain types of data collections have been
(mis)used for eugenic and similar purposes offers im-
portant insights. Seltzer and Anderson [122] describe
ten historic cases in which documentary evidence exists
to link the use of population data systems with human
rights abuses. In some of these cases the data systems
were “neutral” or even intended for population benefit,
before being subverted for eugenic purposes. For ex-
ample, in the Netherlands a population registration sys-
tem was established in part to conduct social research,
which was subsequently adapted in 1941 for the appre-
hension of Dutch Jews who were then deported to death
camps. The death rate among Dutch Jews (73 %) was
dramatically higher than that among Jews in France
(25 %) and Belgium (40 %), as well as Jewish refugees
living in the Netherlands during the Nazi occupation.
Seltzer and Anderson argue that this was largely due to
the fact that the registration system in the Netherlands
facilitated the apprehension of Dutch Jews. Critically, the
point here is not that the collection of a particular form
of data resulted in human rights abuses, but that their
availability facilitated such abuses.
Consideration of the ELS implications of health data
has predominantly occurred in the context of developed
countries, characterized by stable democracies that pride
themselves on good human rights records (irrespective
of evidence to the contrary). As a consequence, the
macro-political context within which ELS issues are de-
bated is often presumed to be constant. Seltzer and
Anderson’s analysis highlights the flaws in this assump-
tion. Ideological and other shifts in national sentiment can
dramatically alter circumstances for particular groups,
threatening their status as citizens and personal security.
Given the potentially extreme longevity of electronic data
collections, significant shifts in macro-political environ-
ments need to be considered not only a possibility but a
certainty. Recent increases in immigration to Europe, for
instance, are associated with an upsurge in support for
rightwing political parties. Given that many of these par-
ties across Europe explicitly target immigrants or specific
minority groups, it is not unreasonable to suppose that if
they gained political power, they might attempt to gain ac-
cess to any population data systems allowing them to fur-
ther discriminatory goals. Similarly, at least one of the
leading contenders of the Republican nomination for the
2016 U.S. presidential elections strongly supports the
forced deportation of any immigrants who are in the
country without legal authorization, barring any refugees
from Syria from entering the country [123], and has con-
sidered the possibility of keeping a database specifically on
Muslims [124].
Our point here is not that we predict that databases
currently being constructed will be used for such pur-
poses. Rather, our point is that such uses are conceivable
(it has happened before). Therefore, it is an oversight
that the ELSI literature has not seriously discussed the
potential link between utilization of population and
health data by authoritarian or populist governments for
ends that violate human rights.
Data security and other uses of health data
The potential for harmful secondary uses of health data
has been recognized by some government agencies. In a
2003 report focusing on the ethical, legal and social im-
plications of developments in genetics, the Australian
Law Reform Commission noted controversial uses of
genetic information relating to law enforcement, immi-
gration, and many other public domains [125]. Perhaps
more concerning, a joint report, National and Trans-
national Security Implications of Big Data in the Life
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Sciences, by the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science (AAAS), the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation (FBI) and the United Nations Interregional Crime
and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) observed that
with increasing amounts of health data, more data shar-
ing, and improvements of analytic tools, there is an asso-
ciated increase in risks for stealing sensitive data and “to
inflict harm on individuals or groups, support a criminal
enterprise, or disrupt Big Data applications to cause
negative economic, political, or other societal outcomes”
(p. 17) [126]. The report further concludes that “risks
can range from inappropriate access to sensitive data
such as the numerous examples of cyber attacks to
healthcare databases …, to the use of Big Data analyses
in designing harmful biological agents.” (p. 34) [126].
Given extensive efforts to facilitate the sharing of
health data across jurisdictional boundaries, such as the
Global Alliance [127], attempts to compel access to
health data by foreign governments once data have been
shared across jurisdictional boundaries must also be
considered, and the dynamic nature of political environ-
ments in countries beyond the origin of the health data
cannot be ignored. Concerns must be acknowledged, for
example, of such data being used to support new forms
of eugenics in autocratic regimes outside of the jurisdic-
tion within which the data were originally collected.
Interestingly, the Court of Justice of the European Union
(C-362/14) recently found the U.S. Safe Harbour agree-
ment invalid, in part due to the Snowden revelations
about NSA access. The agreement previously formed
one of the bases for transfer of data from the EU to the
U.S., and data transfer from the EU to the U.S. is cur-
rently legally challenging [128]. Health data might also
be used for homeland security. Legislation such as the
USA Patriot Act suggests at least the possibility of gov-
ernment agencies forcing access to health data repositor-
ies for purposes of improved surveillance. Indeed,
substantive efforts to link health and homeland security
databases have been underway in the U.S. at least since
the terrorist attacks of 9/11 [129]. Or, health data might
be used to identify individuals with propensities (“gen-
etic predictors”) for criminal activity [130], or vulnerabil-
ity to addiction [131].
We hope that these examples of secondary uses suffice
to make our point. In some instances, they are more
hypothetical (e.g., use of health data for border security);
in others, precedents for secondary uses have already
been established in some jurisdictions with varying pub-
lic responses (e.g., newborn blood spots used for forensic
purposes; biobank samples used to adjudicate in bio-
logical kinship disputes). It is also important to note that
the health data collections we described above all exist
within different legal frameworks, with different levels of
electronic security, and hence affording different degrees
of legal and illegal access. It might be argued, for ex-
ample, that genetic information is well protected in gov-
ernment funded research databases, but that the same
(or similar) information might not be as well protected
legally and electronically when collected and held by
direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies. In all
cases, we have sought to illustrate that the existence of
health data collections creates affordances for uses that
are not envisaged in their original purpose.
Conclusions
The implications of large amounts of health data being
collected, stored, and shared for health research cannot
be understood in isolation from other societal trends. In
particular, new challenges relating to big data are recog-
nized for all kinds of electronic information unrelated to
health, such as consumer purchasing behavior, internet
browsing patterns, and the vast amounts of personal in-
formation available about every one of us on the web.
Critical scholarship in these contexts points to the limi-
tations of protecting privacy by giving individuals more
control of data about them [132], and of relying on
“notice-and-consent” as cornerstones of online privacy
[133, 134]. Given the nature of digital data with its po-
tentially indefinite lifespan and unprecedented capacities
for re-analysis and information sharing, we need to
adopt a much longer time horizon in examinations of
societal implications. Indeed, addressing some of the is-
sues we have raised in this paper is likely an important
step toward establishing justifiable, legal data sharing
solutions for the long term within the health care and
research sector. We also need to be broader in the
scope of our considerations. Limiting privacy consider-
ations to issues around informed consent and de-
identification (or anonymization) tends to focus on impli-
cations for the individual. However, information collected
in health research clearly has implications for family mem-
bers and the identifiable ethnic groups to which individ-
uals belong, in the present and the future, particularly
when we consider genetic and genomic data. We also
need to consider the implications of living in a society in
which the collection and electronic storage of health data
have become increasingly normalized.
To this end it is worth considering briefly some of the
mechanisms we might rely on to protect against misuses
of data, and to assess their effectiveness for the kinds of
scenarios described above. Computational mechanisms
to safeguard data are certainly an important aspect of
managing ELS concerns surrounding biobanks and
health data, and significant efforts in this regard are
taking place [135]. However, as documents such as the
National and Transnational Security Implications of Big
Data in the Life Sciences [126] testify, it would be a mis-
take to assume that even very sophisticated electronic
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safeguards cannot be circumvented. Further, computa-
tional and technical safeguards in themselves are insuffi-
cient in the face of changes in public and political
sentiment, especially if these lead to changes in policy or
law. Electronic security measures are tools that do not
serve to protect against the authorities who are in charge
of those tools. In the US, a certificate of confidentiality
may be issued on the request of a researcher, if data are
deemed highly sensitive; this certificate is intended to
permit the researcher to refuse a legal request for identi-
fiable data [136]. Limited case law suggests that certifi-
cates of confidentiality can protect against compelled
disclosure of data. However, an evolving legal climate in
which data are seen as essential to support core govern-
mental functions, such as national security or affordable
health care, could result in overriding such certificates.
Importantly, many countries do not provide the equiva-
lent of US certificates of confidentiality.
Another mechanism we currently rely on to protect
participants in research from harm (unintended or
otherwise) are Research Ethics Boards (REBs) or Institu-
tional Review Boards (IRBs). Although they arguably
provide many important protections, the scope of IRBs
does not protect from the kind of societal consequences
we have discussed in this paper. Indeed, consideration of
“social consequences” is strictly outside the bounds of
U.S. human research protection regulations [137]. In
Canada, the TCPS2 does not prohibit REBs from consid-
ering societal consequences of research, but nor does it
specifically ask boards to consider these. The Oviedo
Convention [138] and the Norwegian Act on Medical
and Health Research [139] similarly state that the risks
and benefits of research must be assessed for the indi-
vidual, but REBs are not obliged to consider broader so-
cietal aspects of the research. And while IRBs have
authority over individual research studies, they generally
do not have the power to deny a government access to
certain forms of data. They certainly do not have the
power to restrict uses of data that have been shared be-
yond their jurisdictional boundaries (note, however, dis-
cussion around the need to give greater recognition to
group harms of research) [140]. Notably, IRBs also differ
in how they handle risk and protect research partici-
pants. The literature shows variation between how
boards interpret what is considered research and what
type of ethics review is necessary [141, 142]. Even if IRBs
were to consider some of the broader consequences of
using secondary data for one study, this consideration
might differ from IRB to IRB. But more importantly, the
use of anonymous data for secondary use may also es-
cape research ethics review altogether under current
(U.S. and other) regulations. And if research is done in
private institutions, it too may not be reviewed by IRBs.
As such, IRBs might offer little to no protections to
individuals in addition to insufficient consideration of
social consequences.
Anonymisation of data by itself is also not an entirely
satisfactory or feasible solution to protect data [143–145]
nor does it meet the needs of those who would rather not
have their data included in particular types of research
[146]. Further, in some cases, researchers may need identi-
fiable or re-identifiable data [147]. For example, some of
the health data sources we have described are by their na-
ture associated with personal identifiers (e.g., clinical
health data; social networking profile). Further, when it
comes to collecting data for health research, the more the
data is stripped of information that could be used to iden-
tify an individual, the less the data are useful to answer
certain types of research questions [148]. There is there-
fore an incentive and societal value to the collection of
identifiable data. Finally, anonymisation can often no lon-
ger be guaranteed because in many instances it is possible
to re-identify individuals from “anonymized” health data
[149–151]. In some instances, such as the Personal Gen-
ome Project, the idea that personal information could be
private in the modern digital world is rejected as unfeas-
ible. Rather than attempting to protect the privacy of re-
search participants, the project leaders thus focused on
recruiting participants willing to accept the risks associ-
ated with having their genomes published publicly
(though we would argue that the conceptualization of
such risks was likely not sufficiently broad). Finally, even
participant-centric consent models [152], while undeni-
ably an important step forward in resolving challenges re-
lating to informed consent in large scale research
platforms, in themselves do not guard against the type of
problems we have outlined in this paper. Indeed, most of
the mechanisms we typically rely on for human subjects
protection in research do not address issues of access over
which the host of the data platform has no control (e.g.,
IRBs do not have the authority to resist government man-
dated access). It is also of concern that the recent report
on National and Transnational Security Implications of
Big Data in the Life Sciences cited above further notes that
“Beyond access controls, encryption, and other common
data and cyber security technologies, no solutions exist
that prevent or mitigate attacks on databases or the cyber
infrastructure that support Big Data in the life sciences,
which could result in consequences to the life science,
commercial, and health sectors.” (p. 17) [126].
If concerns about unintended use of health research
data are to be taken seriously, and if current safeguards
are indeed insufficient, what might be some appropriate
steps to take in guarding against particular forms of un-
intended consequences? At this point, we have no con-
crete solutions to offer. Our aim in this paper has been
to raise issues, which we believe have been neglected in
existing ELSI discussions on the topic. Our hope is that
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this paper will generate more vigorous debate of these
issues among ELSI and other scholars.
Along with others we believe that a key consideration
lies in fostering greater public discourse and transparency
about these issues [153–155] and in the development of
strong and independent governance structures for bio-
medical data and sample repositories [32, 156, 157]. How-
ever, to date little effort has gone toward articulating the
particularities of how such governance might look like.
What efforts have gone towards articulating governance
structures for biobanks point towards greater public par-
ticipation and control of biomedical data and samples at
an institutional level [158, 159]. Winickoff ’s proposal for
the use of charitable trust models to structure biobanks
and their relationship with tissue donors provides excel-
lent guidance in this regard, with increased emphasis on
responsible stewardship on the part of the biobank, and
increased possibilities for meaningful involvement in gov-
ernance on the part of donors [160]. However, even these
models do not protect from many of the issues we dis-
cussed here, nor are they implementable for all forms of
data collections.
To address the problem of the unsanctioned secondary
use of health data at a governmental level, health data
governance needs to have deep democratic roots. These
governance structures need to be sufficiently strong and
independent to be able to withstand governmental and
other equally strong pressures to redirect use of data re-
sources away from the originally intended purposes
without legitimate democratic scrutiny. With regard to
transparency and public discourse, recent efforts to in-
clude a voice in biobank policy via deliberative public
engagements are a good start [161], and similar method-
ologies could be developed for other data collections, as
has been proposed for implementing predictive analytics
in healthcare [70]. Community-led groups constructing
health research platforms also provide important prece-
dents with regard to alternative models for governing
health research and data [162]. However, while these ef-
forts do create mechanisms for the direct involvement of
lay publics, patients, and research participants in the
governance of health data collections, they have so far
been limited in the extent to which they elevate debate
of the issues to truly national levels. Moreover, delibera-
tive and participatory mechanisms that help inform the
governance of health data collections do not in them-
selves provide protection against government or court
ordered access.
Secondary uses of health data are not necessarily un-
desirable. For instance, their use in helping to identify
victims in mass casualty events, while certainly not
unanimously acceptable, is likely to find strong societal
support (see also [163], for other beneficial secondary
uses of data and [70] for suggestions on minimizing
potential harms). In other cases, such as the hypothetical
example of using health data collections to inform health
resource allocation, the degree of societal support would
likely change over time and depend on contextual fac-
tors such as dominant ideological commitments and
economic conditions. Support for singling out high users
of health care, for instance, may vary depending on
whether the underlying purpose is deemed discrimin-
atory or supportive. Yet other potential uses, such as
those relating to human rights abuses, should be
guarded against no matter what the dominant societal
commitments are at any given time in any given place.
No matter that the probability of such abuses might be
assessed as being very small, the outcomes should they
occur would be catastrophic (as illustrated in historical
examples). Frustratingly, it is these types of unforeseen
and unintended abuses of health data that will likely be
the most difficult to guard against. Many of the exam-
ples of adverse uses we have discussed in this paper
might be guarded against with adequate legal protections
within jurisdictions and strong binding data sharing and
custodianship agreements between jurisdictions. How-
ever, these protections will not guard against strong
ideological shifts resulting in changes in government.
Developing institutional, legal, and other safeguards to
protect against possible encroachment of future govern-
ments seems daunting to say the least. And perhaps it is
not possible. But at minimum, discourse about these is-
sues needs to occur on political levels at which meaning-
ful democratic guidance can be deliberated. These kinds
of activities are not yet sufficient to address fully the
concerns we have articulated here, but they point in the
right direction. In all likelihood, effective ways to safe-
guard against (adverse) unintended and unforeseen uses
of health data collections will require at a minimum: a) a
combination of legal frameworks based on broad and in-
clusive deliberations on a societal level, b) technical in-
frastructure in line with these frameworks, which would
make it difficult for changing governments to signifi-
cantly amend the purpose(s) of the health databases, and
c) policy at the level of biobanks and other health data
platforms, which raises awareness of the possibility of
encroachment on the resource for non-health research
purposes, as well as providing more fine-grained dy-
namic control in regulating details about data usage. We
realize that this is a no small task, but are of the opinion
that now is the time to consider debating the need for
such safeguards.
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